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I INTRODUCTION: 
1.0 A Meeting to discuss the extent of the Zambian Debt crisis and to act by creating a Zambian 
Coalition on Debt and Development, was held at Garden House Motel, Lusaka from 5 to 6 
August, 1994. 
2.0 It was organised by AFRODAD (The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development) 
in conjuction with the Economics Association of Zambia 
3.0 AFRODAD and The Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) are grateful to ICCO, the 
Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation of The Netherlands for funding the 
cost of the meeting through AFRODAD. 
4.0 This report is a summary account of the presentations and discussions of the Meeting. The 
first day was dedicated to revealing the existence and extent of the Debt Crisis and other 
factors contributing to the crisis; reviewing some efforts made at mitigating the crisis and 
identifying the role and responsibility of civil society in dealing with the crisis; and finally, on 
the basis of the discussions, act by finding the modality of intervention; establishing a 
Zambian Coalition to intervene in the mitigating the Debt crisis through concerted efforts in 
lobby and advocacy work. The second day was spent largely in Working Groups working out 
the critical issues and the modalities of the Coalition to be established. 
This document also includes the list of the members of the Steering Committee which was 
eleceted on 12 August, 1994 as well as the final Constitution of the Zambia Coalition on Debt 
and Development which was adopted by the Seering Committee on 27 August, 1994, 
providing the basis of legalisation of the Coalition as a Zambian organisation. 
II ATTENDANCE: 
5.0 The Meeting was attended by 48 people; individuals and representatives of 28 organisations 
from the Churches, the Labour Movement, the Press, Professional Organisations, 
Government, The Banks, Lobby Groups and NGOs. The list of participants is attached 
herewith in the Appendices . 
Ill ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS: 
A . OPENING REMARKS: 
6.0 In his opening remarks Opa Kapijimpanga the Coordinator of AFRODAD noted that in much of 
Africa today, and specifically in Zambia, little is discussed of the external debt crisis and its 
consequences. This has left the ordinary Zambian with the impression that the Debt crisis 
does not exist; even when there is a general understanding that all is not well. He 
emphasised that the Debt crisis affected all Zambians and that it was therefore the 
responsibility of all Zambians to address the issue and not leave it to be a matter for the 
Government of the day to resolve. What was clearly missing until now was the existence of 
horizontal relationships or Coalitions of civil society organisations and individuals to deal with 
the issues like the Debt crisis in a systematic way. It was therefore the key objective of the 
Meeting to discuss the Debt crisis and find ways of increasing general awareness and dealing 
with it in some systematic and concrete way. 
4 
B. DEBT AS A CONSTRAINT TO ZAMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT: 
7.0 The relative size and the burden of Zambia's external debt is worrying; it is chronic and has far 
reaching consequences. Every Zambian owes $ 900 while the GDP per capita is only $ 265. 
In 1987 Zambia's external debt was 3.4 times the country's 1987 GDP. Similarly in 1991 
external debt was 624.8% of Zambia's export of goods and services. 50.3 % of proceeds 
(earnings) from exports went into servicing the debt. While the per capita income of Zambia 
has been declining, the debt overhang on the other hand has been increasing. Another 
indicator of the crisis is that 80% Zambia's capital expenditure budget is donor funded. 
8.0 The implication of debt servicing requirements outstripping the GDP is that Zambia lacks the 
capacity to sustain its development efforts both in the short-run and in the long-run. The Debt 
overhang has a direct negative impact on people's livelihood because investable funds are 
diverted into Debt servicing. 
9.0 Until now it is not clear to the ordinary Zambian the extent of the problem and how Zambia, like 
many other African countries, got locked up in the Debt trap. For those who know, it is 
generally attributed to borrowing resulting from the two oil price increases of 1973-74 and 
1979-80 which had led to a record balance of payments deficits.Copper production had 
peaked in 1973 and had began to decline thereafter. Zambia first borrowed from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance of payments support in the same year (SDR 19 
million). Due to availability of cheap money due to the existsence of surplus petrol dollars 
Zambia borrowed heavily ( a total of SDR 1.7 billion by 1984 from the IMF alone). Many of the 
loans contracted were not made with any serious economic calculations; at the time of maturity 
none of the loans had created sufficient growth to facilitate their loans liquidation. It is also 
important to note that inspite of the extensive borrowing from the IMF, World Bank and 
Bilateral donors economic performance continued to slide down. By 1991 the total external 
debt had climbed to US$ 7,3 billion and by 1993 25% of the Debt stock of US$ 6.3 billion 
(after some debt cancellation) had been made up of rescheduled loans. Clearly there was the 
lack of foresight on the part of the Zambian government on the long-term growth and 
development of the Zambian economy and its capacity to service the loans. 
10.0 The composition of the debt raises even more serious problems with regard to how it can be 
solved. Multilateral debt ( US$ 3.1 billion at 1993) at over 45% of total debt stock poses a 
heavy burden in that these loans cannot be rescheduled. Equally worrying is the fact that 
bilateral debt ( at US$ 2.7 billion) is negotiated through the Paris Club, an institution that 
continues to show inflexibility in dealing with the African Debt crisis. 
11.0 The largest single proportion of Zambia's debt is owed to the IMF (US $ 1.2 billion at 
December, 1993). IMF loans are short term and non-project. They are balance of payments 
loans contracted mainly to buttress current consumption at high interest rates. A further 
problem to Zambia's multilateral debt structure is that the loans were obtained at time when 
Zambia was relatively prosperous (ie middle income) and therefore not eligible to cheap 
credits from multilateral institutions such as IDA loans. It now has to repay these high interest 
loans when it is much poorer as it has joined the group of poorest of poor countries. This 
makes the debt burden for Zambia extremely heavy. It is much easier to service debt when the 
economy is growing. 
12.0 Multilateral debt is supposed to be better than commercial and bilateral debt for it has longer 
grace and repayment periods and at times lower interest rates. Therefore, the grant element 
of the loans from these sources is supposed to be high compared to others. In more recent 
times this has turned out not to be the case and for other reasons such as ineligibility for 
rescheduling, cancellation or many of the other strategies such as investment or 
environmental swaps, this source of debt is increasingly becoming problematic. Because of 
these conditions, the reality today is that Zambia has to borrow from other sources (including 
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bilaterals through IDA), and at times from commercial markets at high interest rates to service 
Multilateral Debt. What could have constituted fresh injection of financial resources from 
Bilateral donors in form of grants is also diverted to servicing the multilateral Debt. It is for this 
reason that many analysts have argued that these institutions ( IMF, World Bank and other 
Multilateral) have become the problems in themselves rather than the solution to Africa's 
debt crisis. They want to collet their debt no matter what the economic problems the debtor 
country is facing. 
13.0 When the debt stock is of Zambia's magnitude (at US$ 6.8 billion), the economy is in decline 
and credit worthiness so low, naturally it is not possible to remain current on all Multilateral 
debt. Consequently, this debt is refinanced through a build up in arrears which then deepens 
the crisis. To reduce the high dependence on external financial resources for refinancing the 
debt and for reducing the declining economic growth, Zambia has to seek solutions to the 
currently deepening Debt crisis. 
14.0 At this stage therefore, it is important to note that the high levels of debt contracted by Zambia 
require that the country spends a large proportion of its current external earnings on debt 
service. This constitutes a developmental problem since the more of resources devoted top 
debt service the less will be available for expenditure on development and growth. 
15.0 We can conclude that Zambia is currently faced with a debt crisis because it contracted loans 
that did not contribute anything to the growth and development process. Many of the loans 
were given because of an excesss of supply over demand for loanable funds arising from the 
oil crisis of 1997 and 1979. Clearly there was a lack of foresight on the part of the Zambian 
government on the long-term growth and development of the Zambian economy and its 
capacity to service the loans. There is a need for a new thinking and action to mitigate the 
current crisis as well as safeguard against a repeat of the same in the long term. 
Plenary D iscuss ions : 
16.0 It was noted that the internal Debt which has also reached unmanageable proportions and is 
also a crisis is itself a consequence of the external debt problem and Structural Adjustment 
Programme measures. It is necessary to revisit the whole macro-economic framework that 
impinges on both the internal and external debt problems. 
17.0 There was concern expressed at the failure of the projects funded through loans from the 
World bank, the IMF and Bilateral donors. It was strongly felt that the blame cannot be put only 
on Zambia alone especially when most, if not all, projects are appraised and evaluated by 
donors. In many cases there have also been the donor technical expertise involved in the 
projects. Equal responsibility for the failure of the projects and consequently a sharing of the 
burden of the debt on these projects by both the Debtor and the Creditor must be agreed on 
as a matter of principle. (Information on these projects is required for the negotiating 
processes). 
18.0 Concern was expressed at the blackmailing of defaulting countries by the World Bank, the IMF 
and other donors when they themselves have been identified by the people as the culprits in 
the existing crisis. Ways to put an end to this must be found. 
19.0 The accountability of the World Bank and the IMF was seriously questioned. For all practical 
purposes, countries like Zambia and many others in Africa cannot be said to be members of 
these institutions given their marginal positions and practically no rights (votes) to influence 
the decision making processes there. It is for this reason that these institutions have shown 
that their agenda is not in the interest of African countries. If these institutions are to live to 
their current image, then they should be privatised and operate like any other commercial 
Banks! At the moment they are like parastatals which are not fulfilling their given objectives. If 
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Zambia is to have a breathing space in the Debt crisis, the Preferred Creditor status of the IMF 
and the Bank must be seriously put on the agenda. 
20.0 Under SAP which has forged devaluations of the Zambian currency, the Debt crisis has 
deepened. Devaluation has caused a reduction of the productive capacity of Zambian 
industry by limiting investments given that the imports of investment goods have become 
dearer. Under the SAP regime, it is practically very difficult to increase exports. In fact, contrary 
to conventional SAP thinking, there is no relationship between devaluation and increased 
exports as claimed. On the contrary, there is a decline. The overall result is an increase in 
indebtness which then makes Zambia vulnerable to the Creditors who then have to dictate on 
what policy must be for them to get their money back. In any case the US Government has 
been propping up the value of the US Dollar in the situation of its decline. Why should Zambia 
devalue with negative results? 
21.0 Even when issues of increased exports are discussed, it is clear that GATT is a serious 
problem because it only serves the interests of the developed countries. The African 
countries like Zambia have no say in the international markets. This scenario has seriously 
affected the capability of Zambia to pay its debt as there are constraints in the international 
markets. There is a need for the Coalition to look at the position of countries like Zambia in the 
international markets and the negotiating processes. 
22.0 In resolving the Debt crisis, it is important now that there is a need for a Forum in which there 
would be a wider participation in the signing, utilisation and settling of Debt. In this respect it is 
important for the Government to ensure that borrowed funds are invested in sectors that 
would be able to pay back. 
23.0 Repayment of Multilateral Debt as a priority, at the expense of people's needs, using Bilateral 
funds (IDA) is causing a shortfall in new resources to Zambia. Ways of influencing the donor 
countries who are in this practice must be found. 
24.0 In summary it was noted that there is a problem of political will to face the challenges and find 
solutions for the country. Mobilising human resources and institutional capacity pose fresh 
challenges to the long term development of Zambia. 
C. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DEBT: 
25.0 As has already been noted in many documents produced by the Economic Commission for 
Africa, the Debt crisis to Africa has actually halted almost all economic recovery and 
development, since in most cases upwards of 33% of export earnings by many countries 
have had to be diverted to Debt servicing. On the whole, the Debt burden takes money away 
from investment which in turn results in low capacity utilisation and lower income and 
employment levels. 
26.0 It is important to mention that the African region has not stood by while the socio-economic 
situation has continued to deteriorate. As it will be recalled, at its second Extra-Ordinary 
Summit in Nigeria, in April 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act 
of Lagos, for the development of Africa by the year 2000. At its Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
in 1985 in Addis Ababa, the OAU Summit also Adopted Africa's Priority Programme for 
Economic Recovery (APPER) 1986-90. Equally in the face of excruciating external debt 
burden, the Third Extraordinary Session of the OAU Summit was convened to adopt the 
"African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis". 
27.0 Although the Africa region in its continued dialogue with the donor community has pressed 
for massive Debt relief ranging from partial, short-term and long-term solutions, there has 
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been a great deal of inflexibility and reluctance on the part of the donor community; they have 
been particularly unwilling to link the debt crisis with the context of factors beyond the debtors 
control such as deteriorating terms of trade and others. They would rather each debtor 
country was treated separately. It is for this reason that various options are being offered 
largely related to rescheduling even if these solutions do not solve the fundamental problem. 
28.0 The struggle to alleviate poverty and eradicate underdevelopment must continue to be 
Africa's pre-occupation. In this regard, Africa must continue to negotiate for Debt relief and 
also the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for the region to give it a completely fresh start. Any 
other plan short of debt cancellation, such as rescheduling , will merely postpone or delay the 
agony and perpetuate poverty and all its attendant evils. 
P l e n a r y d i s c u s s i o n s : 
29.0 The regional institutions like the PTA and SADC lack the political will to move the issues 
forward. This is generally because of the lack of popular participation in the decision making 
processes of these institutions. These institutions remain the domain of the Heads of State. 
Ways of influencing decisions and monitoring of implementation must be found. 
30.0 The whole African region is faced with the Debt crisis that is affecting the poorest of the poor, 
including women and children. The conditionalities of SAP are having devastating effects and 
killing the long term potential for Africa to get out of the crisis. Africa as a whole must work 
towards Debt cancellation. 
31.0 The commitment of the international community to solving the African Debt crisis can be 
questioned since they share the same views as those of the IMF and the World Bank. That is 
why although they seem committed, they in fact do not fulfil their commitments. Equally, one 
sees that African organisations like the OAU are really not effective at the global level. It was 
noted that the African governments themselves have weakened the OAU; they do not pay 
the dues to make the organisation more effective. However, the formation of the African 
Economic Community might facilitate the strengthening of the existing inter-governmental 
bodies so that they become viable and could be used as strong blocks upon which to build 
the continent's strength. 
32.0 The examples of the ASEAN-4 countries having moved from being poor to process of 
development is not necessarily comparable examples as the investments in these countries 
are led by Multinationals. Investments in Zambia and privatisation should first mean domestic 
investments if a genuine long term and sustainable development is to be achieved. An open 
invitation to foreign investment and particularly that of Multinationals will not solve Zambia's 
problem of continued net outflows. A counter argument was given to the effect that in the 
ASEAN-4 countries the governments were in full control of policy. Zambia must put its house 
in order and be strong enough to handle foreign investment. 
D. THE AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE TO SAP; ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE DEBT CRISIS: 
33.0 African experience with implementing orthodox Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed 
by the World Bank and the IMF and supported by many donor countries, in the period 1987 
and 1991 showed that they have had a tendency counter to objectives of African economic 
transformation. Principally because orthodox objectives tend to emphasis the pursuit of 
fiscal, trade and other balances which are taken as ends in themselves or as a means to 
increasing traditional exports. Most glaring of its oversight is to expect a universal prescription 
in total disregard of Africa's other fundamental economic weaknesses. 
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34.0 It was principally the failure, both by The Bank and The Fund to perceive correctly that many 
of their remedies were rather unrealistic in the African context, at the material time, that greatly 
contributed the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to spearhead a 
search for 'The African Alternative". The considered opinion of the UNECA secretariat was 
later supported by a number of African states because Africa's deep-rooted problems would 
no longer be obtained without a structural analysis and remedies of the African political 
economy by the Africans themselves. This same general conclusion was reiterated by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 
the "African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis". The sentiments in the 
"Common Position" were indicative of Africa's disenchantment and negative reaction with 
conventional SAPs. Consequently, its architects designed it with a view to include policy 
changes and policy reforms that should have addressed Africa's root causes of economic 
backwardness and linking adjustment with long-term transformation. 
35.0 The African Alternative first and foremost, can be said to have been home-grown. Unlike the 
other, it was not imposed from outside. Second, it perceives the causes and would-be 
solutions to Africa's economic growth and development not purely through the eyes of 
market economies of the western industrialized countries. Third, it provides for a measure of 
socio-economic considerations. In other words, it tries to encompass the African way of life of 
trying to avoid creating additional armies of destitute that result from forced retrenchment. So 
that in applying reduction measures on expenditures by the state and even the private 
sectors, careful consideration is given to both social and economic implications. 
36.0 The African Alternative was never initiated to become confrontational with the Bretton Wood 
SAPs. Somehow and to the regret of many, consolidation of AAF-SAP created an apparent 
animosity between the institutions of Bretton Wood on the one hand, and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa on the other hand. While the wrangle lasted, and the two 
adversaries tried to score points or to out do one another, solutions to Africa's problems were 
relegated to the periphery. 
37.0 The poor rate of implementation of The African Alternative can be attributed to some of the 
following reasons: 
- the little faith or mistrust by many an African policy makers of the initiative itself. The fate 
suffered by the "Alternative" was no worse or different from that of selling African products to 
other African consumers who prefer imported ideas and products. 
- Another of these weaknesses lay in advocating a strategy without sufficient back up 
resources in competition with the rich resource-based Bretton Wood institutions. The Bretton 
Wood institutions don't only enjoy respect of their beneficiaries but actually instill fear in the 
latter. 
- The intensified economic crisis in the early 1980s, meant that many African countries were 
unable to challenge the Bretton Wood or to insist on incorporating Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA) elements in the conventional strategies. Circumstances were such that many had little 
or no other viable option, having already abandoned the approach advocated in the LPA, as 
priority shifted to mere survival at any cost. For a majority of them, it became a matter of "a bird 
in hand (The World Bank or The Fund) being better than two in the bush (The African 
Alternative)". 
38.0 The "African Alternative" was and is still characteristically a comprehensive rather than an ad 
hoc approach to the question of adjustment. Its other significant characteristic lies in the 
attempt to link the latter with long-term transformation. It does not limit it focus to a limited set 
of financial variables as do the conventional approaches of the Bretton Wood programmes. 
Perhaps its most prominent feature lies in the way it proposals to seek to situate the process 
of adjustment in the objective realities and conditions of African societies. Its foundation is 
rooted principally in trying to find solutions to alleviating mass poverty in Africa. 
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39.0 Perhaps the picture would have been a little different had the African Alternative not suffered 
from so many frustrations at the outset. In other words, if it had been implemented, perhaps it 
might have somehow mitigated a substantial part of the region's external debt burden. This is 
a logical conclusion going by its underpinning framework and the suggested policy measures 
that focused on the following: (a) improving and increasing the efficiency of the production 
capacity i.e. supply policies; (b) efficient allocation of resources; (c) proper management of 
expenditure patterns whose centrality was improvement of the quality of life; and (d) greater 
accent on capacity building policies and measures. 
Plenary d iscuss ions : 
40.0 It is true that SAP is essentially "round pegs in square holes". It is a programme designed by 
the north and without a human face. It was agreed that there is a need for creating a Round 
Table at which Zambian civil society could be represented in a structured way. However, if the 
current lack of coordination between the various representations of civil society continued, 
then effective representation cannot be achieved. In this regard, there is a need for adequate 
preparations before participation in discussions and negotiations around these issues. 
41.0 Africa and individual countries must put their structures ("houses") in order to resolve the 
Debt crisis. International response and support to the African alternative is not sufficient and 
neither should be expected as there is little benefit for the developed countries. A Coalition 
could play a role in the renewal and confidence building process. 
42.0 The political leadership should be addressed and advised. If advice is delivered well, it is 
usually taken. Politicians should use the professional capacity in the country for advice 
instead of being suspicious. There is also fragmentation among the advisors themselves. 
Increasing advice capacity is going to be key in the work of the Coalition. 
43.0 Accountability of the policy makers to the people is crucial. They have to explain to the people 
what is really happening. This is not generally done. 
44.0 It was agreed that a Coalition be formed to systematically face the challenges of SAP and bring 
aboard the African Alternative onto the development agenda in a structured way. 
Communication network in Africa around the Debt issue is important for sharing ideas and 
views as well as influencing policy. 
E . INTERFACE BETWEEN SAP AND DEBT. 
45.0 The period since the latter part of the 1980s has seen the advent of critical changes in the 
political structures and economies of Sub-Sahara Africa. The case of Zambia is significant in 
that, these "winds of change" have been most dramatic and, whilst being inter-related, have 
evoked sharply differing reactions amongst the public at large. Whereas, the introduction of 
multi-party democracy has received popular acclaim, the same cannot be said about Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP). Arguably, these changes have also redefined the course 
and character of Zambia's socio-economic and political life in many ways. For example, the 
most visible elements of the Government's policies have been, the seemingly, unwavering 
commitment to following the IMF-driven Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) while 
productive capacities and export earnings have been diminishing, the magnitude of the debt 
burden has been increasing especially due to the deteriorating terms of trade and poor 
balance of payments (BOP) position. On the other hand, Zambia has relied on rescheduling 
of debt payments as a way of bringing about relief and furthering domestic economic balance 
and public expectations. 
46.0 It can be argued that the interface between SAP and Debt is to be found in the measures 
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prescribed by creditor nations through the IMF and World Bank that an indebted country 
adopts in order to reduce the debt stock by way of macro-economic stabilisation which frees 
market distortions and engenders fiscal discipline. 
47.0 In order to illustrate this interface, we can briefly examine Zambia's position in terms of the 
debt burden and structural adjustment measures which have been adopted. Zambia is a good 
example of how the national debt burden has been interspaced with attempts at economic 
reform. This, however, has been matched with equal volatility as seen by negative rates of 
economic growth, collapse of domestic production capacities and invasion of imported goods 
which are absorbing scarce foreign exchange resources available and therefore thwarting 
meaningful economic development. The question is: how much of the present position is self 
inflicted? In addition, should we be agitating for Debt forgiveness or write-offs on one hand 
and seeking further credit on the other without putting our houses in order? 
48.0 It is suggested that in order to present an effective front that can tackle the debt problem, we 
should firstly realign our national economic priorities and improve our planning base for the 
utilisation of both local and borrowed resources. Resource allocation has continued to be 
determined by dictates of political expediency rather than from a standpoint of a poor nation 
with inadequate capacity to finance unnecessary expenditure. In addition, information on our 
debt position and investible resources that are being negotiated is not known. It is clear that 
Government planning has not changed and traditional methods of assessing priority areas 
have persisted. In addition, little information is made available to the public at large on 
allocation mechanisms and priorities apart from the standard documentation has not been 
subject to detailed review against performance. 
49.0 If we are to create an interface that we can influence between SAP and Debt, we need to set 
out our own priorities that can be matched with external measures and thus ameliorate the 
adverse impact of externally driven economic reform. An important start should be the 
rationalisation of the national budgetary process and imposition of controls over the process 
of determining priorities for which demand for scarce resources can therefore be assessed 
and allocations to expenditure heads followed up with a monitoring mechanism. 
50.0 Greater accountability should be espoused over Government's systems and use of resources 
prior to presenting an argument for Debt forgiveness or seek to share the debt burden with 
our creditors. Clearly we shall continue to remain weak in areas of negotiations with our 
international creditors as long as we consider the present levels of demand for foreign credit is 
unavoidable. 
Plenary D iscuss ions: 
51.0 While the issue of a country like Zambia being insolvent was appreciated, the reality is that 
Zambia cannot be insolvent given its abundant resources, especially its people and the 
potential brain power that exists; all these outweigh the current monetary liabilities. What is 
required to be addressed are the terms of borrowing. It was unanimously agreed that African 
states like Zambia can no longer rely on Debt rescheduling as a way of bringing about relief; 
what is required is Debt cancellation. In this regard it was felt that the word "Debt Forgiveness" 
implies and element of wrong doing on the part of the Debtor countries; the term "Debt 
Cancellation" is preferable. Debt distressed countries were not solely responsible for their 
debts; donors must also bear the responsibility for the existing crisis. For example, if the unfair 
trade practices were to be taken into account, it would be found that Debtor countries have in 
fact been robbed of their resources. Time has come to convince the Creditor countries that 
the debt cannot be repaid; hence the case for the formation of a Coalition on Africa's debt. 
52.0 It was noted that SAP was externally driven and that is why they have negative effects. The 
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international lending agencies who have introduced these policies are external to a nation's 
governance and therefore do not take into account the people's concerns views and real 
interests. 
53.0 It was agreed that the discrepancy between public expectations and the actual impact of 
reform programmes can generally be held responsible for the resentment expressed by most 
people against SAP. A view was expressed that in the previous system of national 
Development Plans there was some element of participation by the people unlike in SAP. 
Participation must be made the norm. 
54.0 Concern was also expressed on some aspects of the immediate term measures aimed at 
reducing budget deficits under SAP. For instance, it was wondered whether there was need 
to carry a budget deficit that has to be financed by borrowing or grant aid. There has to be a 
democratisation of resource allocation; this will ensure that resources are spent on national 
priorities. 
F. STRATEGIES FOR ALLEVIATING EXTERNAL DEBT IN ZAMBIA: 
55.0 The sheer magnitude of Zambia's debt problem makes any discussion of possible solutions 
within the official debt reduction schemes rather difficult indeed. Therefore, whatever strategy 
one suggests or adopts will make only a small dent on the problem. This is so because when 
a problem reaches certain magnitude it has an in built mechanism for growth. On the other 
hand it means that new and bold strategies have to be investigated instead with continuing of 
the current ones which have after all failed to make an impact. 
56.0 It has been argued in some circles, and possibly rightly so, that in the final analysis it is the 
political structure and vested interests and allegiances of the ruling elites which determine 
what strategies are possible for solving any problems and where the main roadblocks to 
effective economic and social change lie. If this is true for any problem it is more so for debt. 
57.0 Many suggestions have already been made by analysts on ways of resolving the African Debt 
crisis. It has been suggested that action has to be taken for reducing official bilateral debt; 
reducing multilateral debt including World Bank, IMF, and ADB and eliminating private debt 
which continues to block the flow of commercial to Africa. It has been suggested that this has 
to be both on creditor and borrower level through the following: 
a). Bilateral creditors need to improve on Toronto Terms to Trinidad terms (which entails 
writing off 66.6 percent and rescheduling the balance on IDA terms) for some of the very 
indebted countries such as Zambia especially in view of the changed economic classification 
from a middle income country to a Least Developing country status. 
b). Bilateral creditors should be encouraged to swap their debts for local currency funding 
both for investments in industry and other programmes (at rates that will not create problems 
for monetary control). 
c). For Multilateral Debt: For IMF debt these range from: 
i) refinancing or cancelling upper tranche obligations for those countries which are now only 
eligible for IDA credit like Zambia by special SDR emission to cover the outstanding and/or 
balances or gold revaluation and sales. 
ii) easing conditionality on Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and widening 
eligibility to aim for zero net transfer of resources. 
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d). For Development Banks' Debt, it is being suggested that these institutions should 
finance a one-time write-down of African debt contracted from the hard-window debt through 
the following: 
i) a reduction of their accumulated general and specific reserves and a reduction in their 
administrative budgets until the hard window is written down. 
ii) the use of soft window-repayments for the write down on an annual basis until such a time 
as hard window debt is fully written down and 
iii) moving hard window loans to interest non accrual status, freezing the principal outstanding 
and writing them down through pre-emptive allocations of net income before providing for 
other purposes. 
In this respect, the Africa Development Bank would require additional resources. Bilateral 
donors should support the AfDB. 
The above suggestions have resulted in little improvement in the Debt crisis for most of Africa, 
including Zambia. 
It has argued that the debt strategies followed in the past years, have resulted in too much 
concessional aid to Low Industrialised Countries (LICs) - of which Zambia is a part and their 
own domestic resources being used for: 
a) debt service on non concessional bilateral debt; 
b) debt service to the IMF and Multilateral banks ( the World Bank the African Development 
Bank and others); 
c) relief on private debt buy-backs at too high a price and 
d) quick disbursing assistance (from multilateral institutions) for structural adjustment 
programmes, which have failed to deliver the intended results. (This trend is causing an 
upsurge in Multilateral Bank debt obligations. This has created a phenomenon where these 
institutions have become the major problem rather than the solution to Africa's debt crisis. 
Debt servicing to these countries has taken precedence over essential developmental 
investment in both physical or social infrastructure). 
58.0 The most controversial strategy of all was the decision by the Zambian Government in 1987 to 
declare that debt servicing would be limited to 10 percent of export earnings. The declaration 
was met with international anger ( not that it affected the actual outflow of funds for debt 
servicing in any way because with so little new foreign inflows the country was going to 
default anyway) for it upset the international convention on the subject. 
59.0 The persistence of the debt crisis in Zambia indicates that the strategies adopted to deal with 
the problem have been inadequate. For debt continues to grow and the arrears continue to 
mount. This calls for a more innovative strategies than those adopted hitherto in order to deal 
with the problem. 
60.0 Given that much of the Debt of countries like Zambia is owed to the multilateral institutions, 
existing forms of debt relief, if one can even call them by that name, eg. use of soft windows, 
are totally inadequate. Practically they provide very little relief. Much of the disappointment of 
Africa also arises from the fact that these (Multilateral) institutions do not want to be 
responsible for their own failings. Since IMF conditionality has always centered on macro-
economic policies, failure of the past policy frameworks to stimulate growth and development 
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must surely be shared between the debtor countries and the IMF. Similarly for the World bank 
the fact that projects were appraised and approved by the Bank and in most cases also run by 
Bank staff must mean that failures cannot be attributed to debtor countries alone. 
In commercial Banking terms the risks of these loans should have been borne by the lending 
institutions as well. This, unfortunately is not the case with the multilateral financial institutions. 
They want to be very heavily involved in policy formulation and yet be absolved of any 
responsibilities should anything go wrong. Because of this obvious irresponsible attitude 
towards mistakes committed it might be pertinent to ask whether we should not include these 
institutions as a subject for privatisation. This question is relevant at this stage because of the 
observation that inspite of their strong support for privatisation multilateral financial institutions 
still remain the strongest international parastatals with all the weaknesses that are traditionally 
ascribed to publicly owned commercial enterprises. 
61.0 Bilateral debt: This group is the second largest creditor to Zambia. Bilateral debt is subject to 
rescheduling or refinancing and the Zambian government has had five rescheduling with 
members of the Paris club. Of the total debt stock in 1993, US $ 1.7 billion or 25 percent was 
rescheduled debt. While under normal circumstances refinancing offers some short term 
relief to a country facing temporally balance of payments problems, when the debt is large 
and the underlying causes are structural and deep rooted, it can become expensive. This is 
so because there are costs associated with it: First and foremost, there is the moratorium 
interest on the postponed payment; secondly there is the the continuous cycle of debt 
rescheduling negotiations which diverts attention and time of stretched Zambian 
governments from economic managementcost; and thirdly, there is the cost of travelling to 
Paris. In the situation in which such negotiations are conducted yearly these costs can be 
considerable. To these should be added the non quantifiable cost of being dictated to on 
what policies to follow there after. In recent years , however, some countries have been able 
to negotiate for multi-year rescheduling which has mitigated the costs some what. 
62.0 Furthermore, it has been noted that although the Paris Club was created as a Forum for 
countries with temporary balance of payments problems, frequent rounds of restructuring 
have not lightened the debt burden in countries with severe structural problems. There is a 
need therefore, for a change in the Forum for discussing Debt. Meetings could be held in the 
respective African countries because, among other things, it is rather expensive to make trips 
abroad. 
63.0 As a way of improving the terms of rescheduling bilateral loans, a number of proposals have 
been advanced including the Toronto terms, Trinidad Trems, the Proposals of Pronk and 
Perez de Cuellar to mention a few. It has been largely noted that many of the "Terms" under 
the Paris Club, have in fact not really managed to relieve the debt of the poorest countries to 
any great extent. However, the most favourable aspect of bilateral debt is the possibility of 
debt right-offs which has the impact of reducing the current debt stock and future debt 
servicing obligations. It is clear, however, that most creditor governments prefer to 
reschedule debt even where there is no possibility of such a debt being paid off like in 
Zambia's current situations . Therefore, non financial reasons on the part of Creditors 
influence their decisions whether to write-off some country's debt or not . It is argued that 
how much debt forgiveness a country gets depends more on its political influence it 
commands among the creditor governments and not on need. This implies that political rather 
than technical considerations are more important for resolving the Debt crisis. 
64.0 Commercial Debt: Although this is the debt that has gone into direct enhancement of 
production, it ironically is the debt that has received least attention during times of financial 
difficulties. While governments have struggled to find ways of settling multilateral and bilateral 
debts commercial debt has often been pushed to sidelines. The Baker Plan and later the 
Brady Plan have been important as instruments to reduce the commercial indebtness of 
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middle income countries like Mexico , Costa Rica , Venezuela etc. 
65.0 The following issues should be considered in handling the different types of Debt: 
Multilateral Debt:IMF, World Bank and other multilateral institutions should be made to accept 
some risks for the decisions they make. In this regard, therefore, these institutions should 
write-off a large part of the debts owed by Zambia. If writing off debts is not acceptable then 
the debts should be subject to a market price in the same way that private commercial debt is 
being subjected. The multilaterals must be made to operate in more business like manner that 
they preach about rather than being protected all the time. 
Bilateral Debt: A shift of the negotiating framework is necessary. It is important to ensure that 
more favourable and more flexible negotiating fora be attempted. In this regard, a good start 
will be made by having in-country discussions with the various Creditor countries within 
Zambia in a way that is transparent and with information flowing to the Zambian public. 
As Zambia completes its rights Accumulation Programme towards the end of 1994 it should 
start considering seriously the agenda for its Paris Club meeting. There is a need to change 
the existing menus. 
Commercial Debt: Continued dismantling of eligible commercial debt sold at a discount should 
continue. Implications of these measures should however, be studied and analysed. 
65.0 It has now been generally agreed that any good debt strategy should be adequate in its 
scope to end the negative flows from Africa to industrial countries which the debt servicing 
has created. For without ensuring that debtor countries in Africa become net recipients of 
new funds their outstanding debt cannot be remedied. Bilateral funds should therefore not 
be used for refinancing the Debt. 
66.0 A great deal of attention has been devoted to creditor strategies in the debt problem creating 
the impression that there is nothing at all which debtors can do. Yet there are deliberate 
actions which they can take to result in whether or not a country has a debt crisis. Korea and 
Zambia were both middle income countries in the 70s. Both borrowed heavily yet the former 
does not have Zambia's debt problem. The internal factors, especially policies, explain the 
difference. 
67.0 As already mentioned, although debt is such a big probe in Zambia, its causes have not been 
adequately analysed. As such the Government has continued with the same policies which 
created the problem in the first place. Therefore, debt problem is likely to get worse in the 
long term until these policies are changed. 
68.0 It has been argued and rightly so, that the debt crisis is inevitable in the long run if heavy 
borrowing is not accompanied by productive investment. Thus, for those middle income 
countries which used the money borrowed in the 70's in high-return investments or to bring 
about structural change, have been able to weather off the debt problem. This was possible 
because the debt enhanced those countries' capacity for greater output and hence 
increased the ability to service their long-term debt. The example often given is Korea whose 
external debt grew nine fold in the seventies and yet debt has not been as severe a problem 
compared say Zambia. 
69.0 It can therefore be argued that the wrong sectoral distribution of debt created the debt crisis 
in the 80's which has persisted in the 90's. In Zambia most loans went and continue to finance 
education, health roads and railways or social and infrastructure developments. A 
considerable proportion also went to finance non performing parastatals with no potential for 
growth let alone to export. There is no doubt that the flow of funds enabled developing 
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countries in general and Zambia in particular to attain relatively high investment and economic 
growth rates and general living standards which they could not have enjoyed otherwise. 
These gains, however were temporally as most of it has become obsolete in the 80's and 90's 
due lack of maintenance funds. This outcome among others, casts a lot doubt as to whether 
the strategy of foreign borrowing to put up the infrastructure was worthwhile in the first place. 
70 .0 What then should be done? 
1) Zambia should stop allocating loans to sectors and projects which has no potential towards 
contributing to the repayment of the facility. The schools, hospitals, roads and railways which 
have no inherent ability to contribute towards the capacity to earn foreign exchange should 
only be allocated grants. For, it is this habit which created the debt crisis in the first place. The 
habit assumes that the are or there will be sectors in the economy which will generate the 
foreign exchange to service such debts without taking deliberate action at creating them is 
wishful thinking. 
2) Closely related to the above is that debt management should take a longer-term view of the 
problem. For example, there should be different national debt service scenarios for the next 
20 years or so indicating what the different outlooks if certain events occurred or failed to i.e., 
changes in interest rates, growth lack of it in exports etc. This will help to place the problem 
into proper focus and move us from this short-term approaches of borrowing from Peter to 
pay Paul; characteristic of the crisis in the 80's and 90's. 
71.0 It was generally agreed that the Debt crisis is inevitable in the long run if heavy borrowing is not 
accompanied by productive investment. It was further argued that in Zambia most loans went 
to finance education, health roads, railways and social infrastructure which did not give any 
real returns on investments. The countervailing argument was however, that investments in 
health, education and infrastructure contribute to increased productivity in the economy by 
enabling the economy to perform more efficiently. 
72.0 In conc lus ion , the workshop endorsed the idea of fo rming a Zambian 
Coal i t ion on Debt and Development to tackle the problem of debt and 
related issues. 
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DAY 2: AUGUST 6, 1994 WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, REPORT BACKS, 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENSUS REACHED. 
Working Group 1: 
Extent of the Zambian Debt cr is is; strategies for resolving the crisis: 
73.0 The Coalition must pay attention and develop strategise on how to deal with the following: 
(i). Mutuality of obligations should be ensured by on the part of both the Debtor and the 
Creditor. Since IMF conditionality has always centered on macro-economic policies; 
the failure of past policy frameworks to stimulate growth and development must be 
shared between the debtor and the IMF and other creditor countries that use the 
same conditionality. Similarly, for the World Bank, the fact that the projects were 
appraised and approved by the Bank and in most cases also run by the Bank staff 
must mean that failures cannot be attributed to Debtor countries alone. 
(ii). Agreements for loans should ensure that not more than 20%-30% is spent on foreign 
technical assistance 
(iii) Loan agreements should leave room for recipients to source appropriate technology 
(iv) Centralised system of contracting and management of loans be put in place 
(v) It should be government policy to subject utilisation of loans to public view 
(vi) Acquisition of loans should be subjected to debate by civil society and ratification by 
Parliament. There should be a Standing Committee on Debt and policy makers 
should explain the current situation to the people. Intelligence on the Debt situation 
in the region must be a full time preoccupation which should improve the country's 
negotiations with the Creditors. 
(vii) All debt contracted prior to December 31, 1991 should be written off 
(viii) Refinancing of some loans should be considered periodically 
(ix) Debt servicing should be an integral part of macroeconomic framework to sustain 
economic development and avoid situations where all resources are exhausted on 
debt servicing 
(x) There is an urgent need to form a Coalition for dealing with the crippling debt situation 
and development issues in Zambia 
(xi) We adopt the NGO Debt Treaty in principle and Campaign efforts in the north should 
be supported. 
(xii) The International Community should consider and intervention on the scale of the 
Marshall Plan, for Africa. 
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Working Group 2: 
Awareness Raising, in fo rmat ion gather ing and d isseminat ion, research agenda, 
lobby and advocacy strategies. 
74.0 There was a need to increase the awareness of the NGOs of the positive contributions they 
could put in the formation and success of the Coalition. In this regard, establishment of the 
information network which will ensure the flow of information is necessary. This is possible 
because NGOs were already established institutions with adequate infrastructures. 
75.0 In order to implement and identify the strategies needed, targets had to be set with the 
following groups in mind: Media, Business sector (both small medium and large), Labour 
Movement, Human rights groups, Learning institutions, Members of Parliament, Government 
officials, Religious Organisations, Donors and Grassroots level. 
76.0 In order to achieve the objectives of the proposed Coalition there was a need for action 
oriented programmes which will ensure efficient flow of accurate information. Therefore it was 
felt that it was important to make society understand the topic in order to put pressure on the 
policy makers or representatives of the governments (both Debtor and Creditor). 
77.0 In order to make any use of this information firstly membership had to be institutionalised with 
a professional core who could give advice to target groups. Secondly, there was a need for 
targeting the relevant Parliamentary Committees, as Parliament is an important instrument of 
democratic accountability. 
78.0 The end use of information would have to be mainly influencing government decisions on 
Debt settling, acquiring and uses. This could be achieved through identifying the problems 
that come with Debt then inform the people about them. This will ensure that people are 
sensitised so that they are able to identify critical areas which needed projects to be financed. 
Secondly, this conscientisation of the people in the constituencies will ensure accountability 
by the politicians. Therefore, flow of information will ensure accountability. Thirdly, an 
understanding of the Debt issue by the people would lead to their demand for the 
explanation by the politicians of the nature of the loans, amount and purposes. Therefore with 
adequate information people will be able to determine whether the loan to be acquired is 
necessary or not and be able to reject or accept it. Fourthly, with adequate and accurate 
information the people will be able to monitor the Parliamentary debates. If this is done, 
people will be able to determine whether MPs present to the Parliament the true reflection of 
the effects of Debt and people's needs. 
Working Group 3: 
The Zambian Coal i t ion on Debt and Development: goals and ob jec t i ves and 
operat ing modal i t ies. 
79.0 The Group identified two major goals for the formation of the Zambian Coalition on Debt and 
Development: 
a). To popularise and democratise the issue of Debt among Zambian citizens 
b). To get involved in the articulation of Debt and related issues and intervene in the decision 
making processes 
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80.0 Objectives of the Coalition: 
a). To facilitate an informed debate and sharing of views, analysis and strategies on Debt and 
related issues in Zambia and thereby enhancing greater Zambian public understanding of t h e 
same. 
b). To undertake lobby and advocacy work that will impact on policy and actions on Debt and 
Development 
c). To engage and cooperate with other Forums and Networks in Africa and abroad in pursuit 
of the above 
d). To commission a Plan of Action for the achievement of these goals 
e). To undertake any other plans and activities which promote those goals 
81.0 Structure of the Coalition: 
It was decided that the Coalition will have a General Assembly, an Executive Committee and a 
Secretariat. 
82.0 Steer ing Commit tee. 
A steering Committee made up of the following people was elected for the creation of the 
Coalition and short-term programmes. 
D Musona (Economics Association of Zambia) 
G Ngenda (Ms) (Zambia Association for Research and Development) 
Francis Banda/Lucy Muyoyeta (Oxfam) 
John Kasanga (Economics Association of Zambia) 
Chipo Mweetwa (Ms.) (Economics Association of Zambia) 
Theo Bull (ZACI) 
M Chilwesa (Small Industries Association of Zambia) 
Austin Muneku (Zambia Congress of Trade Unions) 
C Fundanga (Economics Association of Zambia) 
John Munsanje (Children and Youth Lobby Group) 
Opa Kapijimpanga (AFRODAD: ex-official) 
A M Nakalonga (Economics Association of Zambia) Interim Secretariat 
8 3 . 0 CLOSING REMARKS BY DR. CALEB FUNDANGA, CHAIRMAN OF THE ECONOMICS 
ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA. 
In his closing remarks, Dr. Fundanga emphasised the fact that the Steering Committee just 
appointed had a big task to move the work of the Coalition on Debt and Development forward. 
EAZ would provide the Secretariat of the Committee until the Coalition establishesits own 
Secretariat. He also noted that some donor countries are allies in this venture and should be 
included the Coalition. 
It was very important to note, he said, that the Coalition is not meant to fight the government; 
on the contrary, it would provide the necessary support in the government's efforts of working 
on behalf of the Zambians. 
He thanked everybody for attending the meeting which he thought was a great success. 


Appendix II Workshop Programme. 
Day one: 5 August, 1994 
I .0 Opening and Introductory Remarks: Opa Kapijimpanga 
2.0 Debt as a Constraint to Zambia's development: Dr. Caleb Fundanga 
Plenary 
3.0 Regional Aspects of Debt: Dr. Siteke Mwale 
Plenary 
4.0 The African Alternative to SAP; its implications on the Debt crisis: Dr. Jonathan Chileshe 
Plenary 
5.0 Interface between Debt and SAP: John Kasanga 
Plenary 
6.0 Strategies for resolving the Debt crisis : Suya Chidumayo (Ms.) 
Plenary 
7.0 Strategies for resolving the Debt Crisis: Dr. H Sikaneta 
Plenary 
8.0 Towards a Zambian Coalition on Debt and Development: Opa Kapijimpanga 
Plenary 
Day Two: 6 August, 1994. 
9.0 Group discussions, report backs, discussions and consensus reached 
9.1 Extent of the Zambian Debt crisis; strategies for resolving the crisis and Plan of Action for the 
Coalition 
9.2 Awareness raising, information gathering and dissemination, research agenda, lobby and 
advocacy strategies and Plan of Action for the Coalition 
9.3 The Zambian Coalition on Debt and Development: goals and objectives, operating modalities, 
and Plan of Action. 
10.0 Press Lease 
I I . 0 Steering Committee 
12.0 Closing remarks 
Append ix IV: Steering Commit tee: 
First meeting of the Committee was held on Saturday 12 August, 1994 at 09.00 hours. 
Elections were held for the positions in the Steering Committee as follows: 
Chairman: John Kasanga 
Vice-Chairperson: Chipo Mweetwa 
Secretary/Treasurer: Magre Chilwesa 
Committees: 
Information: G Ngenda, J. Munsanje, M. Chilwesa, F. Banda 
Research: C Fundanga, D Musona, T. Bull 
Workshops etc: C. Mweetwa, A. Mukusu, Nakalonga, L. Muyoyeta 
ex-official members: Opa Kapijimpanga 
A M Nakalonga (Secretary) 
C o n s t i t u t i o n 
of the 
Zambia Coal i t ion on Debt And Development 
Title I 
Object ives and Membership 
1 .0 D e f i n i t i o n 
The Zambia Coalition on Debt and Development, hereinafter called the "Coalition", is a Non-Partisan 
coalition of individual and institution members established to contribute to the resolution of Zambia's 
National Debt and Development problems. 
2 . 0 L o c a t i o n 
The headquarters of the Coalition shall be provisionary located within the Secretariat of the 
Economics Association of Zambia, Private Bag W119, Lusaka, Zambia. The Coalition's headquarters 
may be established at another location by a decision of the Executive Committee of the Coalition. 
3 . 0 Goals and Objec t ives 
The overall objective of the Coalition is to contribute to the advancement of solutions to Zambia' socio-
economic development problems. In this regard, the Coalition shall specifically pursue, inter alia, the 
following objectives: 
(a) To be involved in articulation of the Debt problem and related issues and influence national 
decision making; 
(b) To popularise and democratise the Debt issue; 
(c) To facilitate informed debate on the nature and extent of Zambia's debt and, sharing of views 
and strategies for its resolution thereby, empowering and enhancing greater Zambian public 
understanding of the same; 
(d) To conduct research as a basis for lobby and advocacy work on Debt and related issues; 
(e) To undertake lobby and advocacy work that will impact on policy and actions on Debt and 
Development; 
(f) To engage and cooperate with other Fora and Networks in Africa and abroad in pursuit of the 
above objectives; 
(g) To commission plans of action for the achievement of the above objectives; 
(h) To undertake any other activities which promote these objectives. 
4 . 0 M e m b e r s h i p 
(a) Membership of the Coalition shall consist of individuals and any civil society organisations 
other than Political parties defined as follows: 
Corporate Membership 
Membership shall be open to civil society organisations that are not political parties or formally affiliated 
to a political party in Zambia; 
Individual Membership 
Individuals who are Zambian citizens or non-Zambians who are residents may apply for membership of 
the Coalition in their individual capacity regardless of religion or political affiliation. 
(b) Applications for membership of the Coalition shall be made to the Secretary/Treasurer who 
shall submit them to the Executive Committee for consideration; 
(c) Persons so approved for membership of the Coalition shall become members upon payment 
of annual dues for the current financial year; 
(d) Members shall be encouraged to participate actively in the affairs of the Coalition; 
(e) A member who has for some cause other than expulsion ceased to be a member may make a 
written application to the Secretary for reinstatement. The committee may then, if it deems fit, 
order that person to be reinstated on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe; 
5 . 0 S u b s c r i p t i o n 
(a) Members of the Coalition shall pay annual dues in conformity with their obligations and 
responsibility of membership. The amount of the annual due is fixed according to the class of 
membership, i.e. Corporate membership or as an individual. 
(b) The subscription rates may be changed from time to time by the General Assembly upon 
presentation of proposals by the Executive Committee. 
6 . 0 Obl igat ions and Terminat ion of Membership 
(a) Members of the Coalition should conform to the obligations stipulated in the constitution; 
(b) Members shall be required to pay membership fees and dues. Non-payment of fees and 
dues as determined from time to time by the Executive Committee and approved by the 
General Assembly, may lead to termination of membership. 
(c) Members shall be required to comport themselves in a manner that enhances the image of 
the coalition. 
(d) Membership may be terminated by: 
- Resignation/withdrawal 
- Death of the individual member or, in the case of Corporate membership, Dissolution of 
the institution registered under this category; 
- Acts of an individual member using the coalition to advance the cause of political party; 
- Non-payment of dues for a specified period of a year or as fixed by the Executive 
Committee; 
- Expulsion on recommendation of the Executive Committee and decision of the General 
Assembly by absolute majority of members. 
- an affiliate organisation or corporate member assuming political party status; 
Title II 
Organisat ion and Powers 
7 . 0 O r g a n s 
The organs of the Coalition shall comprise: 
The General Assembly 
The Executive Committee 
The Secretariat 
8 . 0 The General Assembly 
(a) The General Assembly of the Coalition shall be constituted by members in good standing who 
have paid up their subscriptions; 
(b) The governance of the Coalition as regards both the administration of its affairs and the 
furtherence of its objectives is vested in the General Assembly which may convene in ordinary 
and extra-ordinary sessions; 
(c) The Coalition's General Assembly ordinary session shall be held not less than two times per 
year; one of which time shall constitute the Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
(d) Decisions by the General Assembly shall be taken by voting as determined by the General 
Assembly; 
(e) Fifty percent of voting members shall constitute a quorum and voting shall be on the basis of 
one vote for the individual members and 10 votes for the institutional members; 
(f) Extra-ordinary sessions of the General Assembly may be convened on the initiative of the 
Executive Committee or if a group of at least 33 percent of the voting members so request in 
writing and append their signatures. The purpose of the session should be stated explicitly in 
the request for the meeting; 
(g) The exact date and place of the extraordinary session shall be determined by the Executive 
Committee, in consultation with those requesting such a meeting; 
9 . 0 The Execut ive Commit tee 





3 Committee Members representing sub-committees 
A representative of AFRODAD an ex-officio member 
Any other members of the Coalition Co-opted by the the Executive Committee 
(b) The Executive Committee shall be responsible for the formulation of policies and programmes 
of the Coalition in accordance with policy guidance provided by the General Assembly; 
(c) The Executive Committee shall make decisions as to the enforcement of any part of the 
constitution on behalf of the General Assembly; 
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(d) The Executive Committee shall be free to recommend to admit as institutional members 
national, sub-regional and international economic agencies and such cultural, educational and 
scientific institutions, and commercial industrial or business enterprises that, in the opinion of 
the Executive Committee, may contribute to the aims and objectives of the Coalition; 
(e) The Executive Committee may from time to time establish ad-hoc committees in which non-
members of the Coalition may be invited to participate; 
(f) The Executive Committee may admit scientific and other organisations as affiliates of the 
Coalition in the manner described in article 17.0 to this Constitution; 
(g) The Executive Committee will meet at least once every month to review the activities of the 
Coalition, formulate the work programme and consider budget issues. A quorum shall be 
formed by four members; 
(h) The Executive Committee shall direct the business of the Coalition in conformity with the 
Constitution and guidelines of the General Assembly. It is the duty of the Executive 
Committee to see that sufficient guidance is given to the Secretariat so that actual operations 
reflect the general guildlines given by the General Assembly and the Executive Committee 
and, as appropriate resolutions passed there-at; 
(i) The Coalition shall be represented by the Chairperson of the Executive Committee. In the 
absence of the Chairperson the vice-chairperson shall of right, assume the functions of the 
Chairperson 
(j) In particular the Executive Committee shall be responsible for: 
(i) The design and implementation of the work programme of the Coalition. 
(ii) Determine the working procedures of the various committees and services of the 
Coalition. 
(iii) Prepare the provisional agenda for the General Assembly 
(iv) Take such actions as appropriate and necessary for the proper functioning of the 
Coalition. 
(v) Oversee the work of the Secretariat. 
(k) The Chairperson of the Executive Committee subject to decisions of the General Assembly or 
the Executive Committee shall have general responsibility for the execution of the policies 
and decisions of these bodies. He/she shall preside over meetings of the General Assembly, 
and the Executive Committee have authority to initiate actions in exercise of the functions 
prescribed for the Executive Committee if an foreseen circumstances make such action 
necessary but he/she shall promptly notify the Executive Committee of the action taken and 
the circumstances which necessitated it. 
(L) The Executive Committee may designate its members to be incharge of the supervision of 
specific administration or scientific activities of the Coalition. 
(m) The Executive Committee shall submit to the General Assembly at each ordinary session of 
the Coalition a report of the Coalition's activities since the previous such report and a 
proposed programme of work for the immediate future. 
(n) The Executive Committee may invite persons who are not members of the Coalition to 
participate in discussions without voting. 
(o) The Executive Committee shall have power to suspend any committee member who it has 
reasonable cause to believe is not properly accounting for any of the funds or property of the 
Coalition; for misbehaving or being inactive and shall have power to appoint another person in 
his/her place. 
(p) As a Non-Partisan Coalition, any member holding an office in a political party shall not qualify to 
hold an Executive Committee position. 
1 0 . 0 The Secretar iat : 
(a) The day to day Activities of the Coalition shall be carried out by a Secretariat appointed by the 
Executive Committee on such terms and conditions as shall be mutually agreed. 
(b) The Secretariat shall be managed by a Coordinator appointed by the Executive Committee. 
The Coordinator shall be accountable for the proper management of the day to day affairs of 
the Coalition as determined by the Executive Committee. 
(c) The Coordinator shall have subordinates as the Executive Committee shall authorise to 
employ; 
(d) The number of staff of the Coalition in the Secretariat and their conditions of services shall be 
determined by the Executive Committee. 
1 1 . 0 F u n d s 
(a) All monies and funds shall be received and paid to the Treasurer through the Coordinator who 
shall deposit the money in the name of the Coalition in any Bank or Banks approved by the 
Executive Committee. 
(b) A sum of money determined by the Executive Committee from time to time may be kept by 
the Coordinator for petty disbursements of which proper accounts shall be kept. 
(c) Authorised signatories of the Coalition cheques shall be any two of the following: 
Treasurer 
The Chairperson of in his/her absence the Vice Chairperson 
1 1 . 0 The Aud i to rs 
The General Assembly shall appoint a firm of auditors, who shall examine the books, vouchers and 
accounts of the Coalition and determine whether they have been properly kept. 
1 2 . 0 Tenure of Of f ice 
The tenure of Office for the Executive Committee shall be for two years. Members of the Executive 
Committee may be re-elected provided that they do not hold the same office for more than two terms. 
1 3 . 0 E l e c t i o n s 
Elections of the members of the Executive Committee and other officials of the Coalition shall be held 
at the Coalition General Assembly. Candidates shall be nominated by voting members. However, the 
Executive Committee may nominate candidates in the absence of other nominations. Elections shall 
be by a simple majority of votes cast. Those to be elected must be voting members of the Coalition. 
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Title III 
Resources and Expendi tures 
1 4 . 0 R e s o u r c e s 
The resources of the Coalition shall comprise: 
subscriptions 
proceeds from the Coalition's activities and 
subsidies, gifts, grants, and other resources acceptable to the Executive Committee. 
1 5 . 0 E x p e n d i t u r e 
Expenditure shall be authorised by the Chairperson in accordance with the approved budget of the 
Coalition. The Secretary/treasurer shall keep accounts of receipts and expenditure. Such Accounts 
shall be placed at the disposal of the auditors and the members of the Executive Committee. Any duly 
paid up member of the Coalition may inspect the accounting records of the Coalition upon 
presentation of a request in writing to the Executive Committee. 
Tit le IV 
A m e n d m e n t s to the Cons t i tu t ion and the Rules of Procedure, A f f i l i a t i on and 
Disso lu t ion of the Coal i t ion 
1 6 . 0 Amendments to the Const i tu t ions. 
Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed by either the Executive Committee or by no less 
then twelve members, provided that their proposals are dispatched in time to reach the Committee at 
least 90 days before the date fixed for the ordinary General Assembly. Such proposals must be 
brought to the notice of the members of the Coalition by a written communication from the Executive 
meeting. Proposal for amendments of the constitution shall be adopted on a two-thirds majority vote 
and those to the Rules on a simple vote. 
1 7 . 0 A f f i l i a t i o n 
The Coalition may make the necessary arrangements for affiliation with any international Coalition. 
Such Coalitions shall be ones that would further the objectives of the Coalition and those of Africa. 
1 8 . 0 
The Executive Committee shall be responsible for preparing Rules of Procedures and implementing 
the guidlines set there-in following ratification by the General Assembly. 
1 9 . 0 D i s s o l u t i o n 
The dissolution of the Coalition may be decided by the General Assembly on a two thirds majority of 
voting members. In the event of the dissolution of the Coalition, the General Assembly shall appoint a 
Committee which will oversee the disposal of the assets, records and liabilities of the Coalition. 
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